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Australia and the 1947 United Nations Consular Commission to Indonesia

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Abstract

The Netherlands' colonial empire was a source of wealth, pride and prestige, being seen by some as an essential element of Dutch identity and the key to the Netherlands' status as a European power. The most prized of the empire's components was Indonesia. When nationalists declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945, Dutch colonialists refused to take it seriously, but they soon discovered that the Indonesians were willing to fight for their newly-declared freedom. They also found that international opinion, especially as expressed in the new United Nations (UN), defended the Republic's right to exist. Australia has been acknowledged as an important contributor to international recognition of Indonesian independence through its actions in the UN Security Council and its membership of the UN Committee of Good Offices (CGO). This article, however, focuses on a lesser-known part of the story: Australia's role in the UN Consular Commission, established at the same time as the CGO. Although the Commission was active for only a short period in late 1947, it deserves recognition on a number of counts: for its pioneering work in UN peacekeeping; as an early example of Australian diplomacy in its region; and for how an examination of its activities, and the responses of the Dutch, the Indonesians and others, can be useful for understanding the course of the Indonesian independence struggle in the years that followed.

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Keywords: Australia; Indonesia; the Netherlands; United Nations

Notes on Contributor

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Introduction

The Netherlands' colonial empire was a source of wealth, pride and prestige, being seen by some as an essential element of Dutch identity and the key to the Netherlands' status as a European power.¹ The most prized of the empire's components was the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia). The Indies were occupied by Japan during the Second World War, but it was assumed that at war's end the Dutch would return and prewar conditions resume. Nationalists who declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945 had different ideas. Returning Dutch colonialists at first refused to take the Republic or its supporters seriously. They soon discovered that the Indonesians were willing to fight for their newly-declared freedom. The Dutch also found that international opinion, especially as expressed in the new United Nations Organization (UN), defended the Republic's right to exist. Perhaps surprisingly, one of the main supporters of the Republic was Australia, a "white" neighbour of Indonesia and former wartime ally of the Netherlands.

The story of the Indonesian-Dutch conflict and Australia's part in its resolution has been told elsewhere and does not need to be repeated in detail here.² Suffice to say that Australia has been acknowledged as an important contributor to international recognition of Indonesian independence through its actions in the UN Security Council and its membership of the UN Committee of Good Offices (CGO). This article, however, focuses on a lesser-known part of the story: Australia's role in the UN Consular Commission. Although the Commission was active for only a short period in late 1947, it deserves recognition on a number of counts: for its pioneering work in UN peacekeeping; as an early example of Australian diplomacy in its region; and for how an examination of its activities, and the responses of the Dutch, the Indonesians and others, can be useful for understanding the course of the Indonesian independence struggle in the following years. The Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices were the result of two resolutions passed by

the Security Council on 25 August 1947; and both resolutions originated from a draft resolution put to the Council by Australia on 30 July (discussed further below). But why was Australia involved in the first place?

Australia, Indonesia, and the Dutch, 1942–47

Prior to the Second World War, Australia's foreign policy and diplomatic relations were mainly coordinated by the British Foreign Office. In the immediate postwar period, the Australian government wanted to play a greater role in international relations and to promote and protect Australia's interests in its region. As early as 1944, Australia's then-prime minister, John Curtin, argued that as an autonomous nation in close proximity to colonies whose home governments were on the other side of the globe, Australia would be in a special position to speak with authority about problems in the region and would play a primary part in their solution.³ In 1945, Australia's minister for external affairs, H.V. Evatt, helped plan the UN Charter and campaigned for the organisation to become a guarantor of collective security. Through the UN, small states such as Australia could play a greater role in international relations than might otherwise have been the case.⁴ It became a tenet of Australian foreign policy that international disputes could and should be subject to UN investigation and resolution, although in practice Australia sought to exercise its own influence and that of its allies to achieve its aims prior to resorting to the UN. A case in point is the way Australia dealt with the situation in Indonesia. Australia was well aware of the unsettled conditions to its immediate north caused by the Indonesian declaration of independence and the refusal of the Dutch to recognise the new government, but it let matters reach crisis point before it took the case to the UN.

Australia's involvement in the story could be said to go back to 1942 when the Netherlands Indies administration established a government-in-exile in Australia following

the Japanese occupation of Indonesia. Many Indonesians accompanied the Dutch, including members of the armed forces, seamen and clerks. When Indonesian seamen in Australia learnt of the Republic's declaration of independence, they refused to load Dutch ships bound for their homeland, believing that the Dutch would attempt to crush the new Republic. In late September 1945, the Indonesian seamen were given support by an Australian trade union boycott on all Dutch shipping. The fact that the Australian government seemed to be doing little to alter that situation was noted favourably by the Republic, but was resented by the Dutch.⁵ Nevertheless, even though Australian officials had made contact with Republican leaders in Jakarta (then still known officially as Batavia), and there was a growing acceptance of the idea that Indonesians should have a greater say in the running of their country, the Australian government's initial concerns with the Indonesian conflict were primarily threats to trade and regional security, not the fate of the Republic. Australia's worries were eased in late 1946 when the Dutch and the Republic reached an agreement at the Javanese town of Linggajati that appeared to offer a peaceful resolution to their differences. Under the agreement, the Dutch recognised the Republic's authority in Java, Sumatra and Madura; both sides agreed that the Republic would be part of a new United States of Indonesia to be formed by 1 January 1949; and the Indonesian and Dutch nations would then be symbolically united under the Dutch crown.⁶

The First Dutch "Police Action" and the Australian Response

The first diplomatic agreement between the Netherlands and the Republic was short-lived. The Dutch claimed that the Republic did not exercise sufficient authority to maintain security and effectively rendered the agreement a dead letter when they launched what they called a "police action" at midnight on 20 July 1947. Using tanks, aeroplanes and large numbers of troops, the Dutch occupied much of the hitherto Republican-controlled territory. On 21 July,

the Republic's president, Sukarno appealed through a radio broadcast for "all countries sympathetic to Indonesia's struggle" to take up the matter of the Dutch "police action" at the UN.⁷ On 22 July, in another radio broadcast, Prime Minister Amir Sjarifoeddin made an "appeal to the world," but "foremost to our friends in Australia to strengthen their efforts in order to stop further bloodshed."⁸ And the Republic's Australian representative, Oesman Sastroamidjojo, sent a telegram to Australia's prime minister, Ben Chifley, on 23 July beseeching him "in the name of humanity and in the interests of friendship between our countries to do your utmost to bring about an end of Dutch aggression which involves misery and slaughter of millions of my people."⁹ By this time, Australian politicians such as Chifley and Evatt had come to believe that the Republic deserved greater support from Australia and wanted to raise the case in the Security Council, but were dissuaded by the United Kingdom. Seeing the matter in Cold War terms, the UK argued that such an action would be an invitation for the involvement of the USSR, which would use it as an opportunity to discredit the West. The British proposed instead to enlist the aid of the United States to pressure the Dutch to accept "some form of arbitral solution."¹⁰ Reluctantly, Australia agreed, but nothing happened and it finally decided to move on its own, lodging its resolution with the Security Council on 30 July 1947.

The Security Council Cease-Fire Order and Creation of the Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices

Australia proposed that the Security Council demand a cease-fire in Indonesia and for the dispute to be settled by arbitration. The Dutch argued that the Security Council had no jurisdiction over the matter, as it was purely a domestic affair. Many Western nations may have agreed, but representatives of several non-Western nations were vocal in their support for the Republic. The US had not wanted the case to come to the Security Council, but it also

did not want to alienate the Muslim and Asian nations (such as Ceylon [Sri Lanka], Egypt, India, Iran, the Philippines, and Syria) that had given clear indications of their opposition to the Dutch policy.¹¹ As a result, the US backed the Australian proposal for a cease-fire, but added an amendment that did away with the arbitration requirement. This resolution, passed on 1 August 1947, was the very first cease-fire order issued by the Security Council and was accepted by both the Republic and the Netherlands.¹² The Indonesian dispute had gathered a lot of attention and the Security Council's decision was greeted favourably around the world, as it seemed that war had been averted.¹³ But the Republic alerted the Security Council soon after that the Dutch had since begun "mopping up" operations and hostilities were not really over.¹⁴ On 29 August, the lieutenant governor-general of the Netherlands Indies, H.J. van Mook, made a declaration on the extent of the area now under Dutch control, which was thenceforth defined by what was called "the Van Mook Line." This announcement seriously complicated the situation, as it trapped large numbers of Republican troops in what was now declared to be Dutch territory.¹⁵

In light of the information on continuing hostilities, Australia proposed that the Security Council appoint a commission to monitor the cease-fire, but it discovered that this was opposed by other Western nations, with fear of Russian involvement cited once again.¹⁶ Finally, a joint Australian-Chinese proposal called for members of the Security Council who had career consuls in Jakarta to instruct them to report to the Council on the cease-fire. This resolution was approved on 25 August.¹⁷ The consuls involved were those of Australia, Belgium, China, France, the UK, and the US (Australia and Belgium were temporary members of the Security Council). Another resolution passed in the Security Council on the same day created a three-member Committee of Good Offices to help solve the dispute.¹⁸ The Dutch and the Republic were each to choose one member of the Committee, and those two to pick the other. The Dutch chose Belgium, the Republic chose Australia, and those two

picked the US. Australia thought this Committee would be active for a few weeks or maybe a month.¹⁹ In fact, it operated for over two years. The story of the Committee of Good Offices is, however, largely beyond the scope of this article, although it will be discussed where relevant.

First Meeting of the Commission, 1 September 1947, and Eaton and Raux's Tour through Central Java and East Java, 3–7 September

Australia surprised the Dutch by seconding its consul for Portuguese Timor, Charles Eaton, to the post in the Consular Commission rather than using its existing consul, who Eaton officially replaced only about a month later.²⁰ When Eaton arrived in Jakarta on 30 August, he upset Dutch officials by his suggestion that he travel forthwith to the Republic's capital, Yogyakarta, to meet with Sukarno and other Republican leaders.²¹ The Dutch view was that the Commission must act as a team, but when Eaton met informally with some of the other consuls they agreed that both joint and individual investigations should be pursued.²² Perhaps one of the most important decisions taken at the first official meeting of the Consular Commission on 1 September was to appoint twenty-four military observers to assess the military situation (which will be discussed further below).²³

One of the other matters agreed at the first meeting of the Commission was that Eaton, in company with the French consul-general, Etienne Raux, would depart for Yogyakarta on 3 September to begin the first investigative tour. The reports resulting from all the consuls' investigative tours were to form the basis of a final report to be submitted to the Security Council. Eaton and Raux travelled to the Republican capital in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aeroplane provided by the Australian government. In Yogyakarta, Eaton and Raux met with Sukarno, Amir and other officials and then undertook an 800-kilometre investigative tour by train and automobile of Republican-held territory in Central and East

Java. Upon return to Jakarta, Eaton sent Canberra his first field report.²⁴ In brief, his and Raux's findings were as follows:

Political

- The Republican government absolutely refuse to accept the Van Mook Line
- Any movement of Dutch troops from stand fast positions at the time of the cease-fire order will be resisted
- The Indonesian attitude is "fanatical" and there is "intense bitterness" against the Dutch "police action"
- The Republican government places complete reliance on a UN solution

Military

- Compared to Dutch military organisation and equipment the Republican army in the area visited is hopeless
- Republican troops, both regular and irregular, are within the Dutch area
- Guerrilla resistance is the only possible form of Republican response and will occur
- Considering the above, there is no possibility of the cease-fire order being observed. It is also impossible to ascertain who first violates the order and it is a waste of time to try to do so

General

- Administration, services and agriculture appear normal
- Imports are impossible [due to a Dutch blockade] resulting in shortages of materials, clothing and medical supplies, but not food
- Morale is high
- There is freedom of religion

Although the five subsequent Commission investigative tours uncovered many details specific to the regions where they were undertaken, the matters highlighted in this first brief field report are remarkably similar to those that featured in the Commission's 22 September interim report, its summary of 11 October, and its final report dated 14 October 1947.²⁵ Moreover, when Eaton travelled to Yogyakarta in September 1948²⁶ and once again in August 1949,²⁷ the attitudes of the Indonesians he met with, and the other issues he reported, echoed those mentioned by him and Raux in the report resulting from their first 1947 tour of Republican territory. It is fair to say that, on the whole, the attitudes and opinions of all the major players, in what came to be referred to as "the Indonesian question," remained constant, or altered only slightly, between the period the Commission was active in late 1947 up to just a few months before the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to the Indonesians in December 1949. The major change, perhaps, occurred in the policy of the US, which slowly developed a more critical appraisal of the Dutch position. But even this shift may have already been visible in September-October 1947 if one compares what is known of the two US representatives in the Commission, Walter Foote and Charles Livengood. This is all discussed further below.

Composition of the Commission and Further Investigative Tours and Activities

Apart from Raux of France, Eaton's companions in the Commission were Paul Vanderstichelen of Belgium; Tsiang Chia-Tung of China; Francis Shepherd and his deputy, E.T. Lambert, of the UK; and Foote and Livengood of the US. Foote was to have been replaced by Livengood, but as both were present in Jakarta when the Commission was announced, both participated in its activities.

The other investigative tours undertaken by the consuls were:

- Eaton and Lambert to Dutch-controlled East Java, 9–13 September
- Tsiang and Vanderstichelen to the Dutch-controlled Tasikmalaya and Sukabumi districts in West Java, 10–13 September
- Shepherd and Livengood to Republican-controlled Yogyakarta, 17–19 September
- Eaton, Raux and Lambert to Dutch- and Republican-controlled districts of Sumatra, 16–21 September
- Foote to Dutch-controlled Bandung in West Java, 26 September

Acting as a group, the consuls also interviewed Republican officials at Yogyakarta on 26 September, and Dutch officials at Jakarta on 29 September. Additionally, Eaton and the other consuls held ad hoc meetings with each other and with Dutch and Republican officials in Jakarta, as well as attending official meetings of the Commission. It was in the latter forum that the matters to be included in the Commission's reports to the Security Council were decided. Information from the other types of meeting was often reported to the consuls' governments, and it is in those reports that the modern researcher can find the most revealing details on the consuls' and their governments' attitudes to the Dutch, the Indonesians, and the other members of the Commission.

What the Consuls and Other Officials Thought of Each Other

Apart from the consuls' reports, their governments' actions in the Security Council and other forums provide further sources for assessing their varying policy positions. Analysis of such material led one researcher, Yong Mun Cheong, to the following conclusions:

The positions of the United Kingdom and United States prior to the First Police Action revealed their general sympathies for the Dutch. Belgium and France were

both European allies [of the Dutch] and colonial powers. The position of China was ambivalent. Its consul in Batavia had the task of looking after the interests of overseas Chinese and too pro-Dutch a stand might have painful consequences for the Chinese in Indonesia. Only the Australian consul was clearly anti-Dutch.²⁸

W.J. Hudson, meanwhile, argues that the Commission's final report was "manifestly pro-Netherlands" (a matter returned to later); yet when commenting on the consuls' reports of their individual tours he declares that "[w]here an Australian official was involved, a report was likely to be favourable to the Republic; where an Australian was not involved, a report was likely to be pro-Netherlands."²⁹

As Charles Eaton was the only Australian involved, it is clearly he who was considered to have been "anti-Dutch," as well as being capable of ensuring that any report he was associated with would turn out to be "pro-Republican." But was this really the case? Eaton was an ex-RAAF airman with the rank of group captain who had extensive experience working with Netherlands Indies air force personnel in north Australia during the Second World War. On 10 August 1945, at the direction of Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, Eaton was made a Knight Commander in the Order of Orange Nassau with Swords. In one of his earliest reports from Jakarta, Eaton commented that the official Dutch attitude to Australia was a "very cold one," but that Dutch friends he met with from the war were "very pleased" to see him.³⁰ During his posting to Portuguese Timor, Eaton was well received by Dutch officials on his travels in neighbouring Netherlands Timor.³¹ Based on his personal history, the characterisation of Eaton as "anti-Dutch" would not seem to be supported. His actions in upholding Australian policy in the Commission may, however, have led to a different interpretation. British consul-general Shepherd praised Eaton in his first report to London on 12 September as "the most energetic member" of the Commission, who seemed "determined

to observe as fast and as often as he can manage.”³² Shepherd retained his high regard for Eaton, but he developed a low opinion of the other consuls, whom he portrayed as docile and uncritical.³³

In his own assessment of his fellow consuls, Eaton wrote on 8 September 1947:

Among my colleagues we have two collaborators, the British and the French Consuls-General. The Belgian is obviously pro-Dutch, the Chinese rather sitting on the fence, and the American [Foote] a master of ceremonies with many Dutch friends over a period of twenty years spent in Java.

He wrote again a few weeks later, when the Commission’s final report was almost complete, but being delayed by the actions of Foote:

This gentleman [Foote] is very pro-Dutch and very anti-Republican, and the same applies to Vanderstichelen, the Belgian Consul-General. At this stage it seems that myself, the British and French Consuls-General will be in agreement and also probably the Chinese. However, the Chinese Consul-General has no particular interest except as regards the treatment of the Chinese.³⁴

Leaving aside the Dutch officials’ opinions of Eaton (discussed below), their conclusions about the consuls are not so different to his own, at least in terms of where he thought their main sympathies lie. Throughout the six weeks the Commission was preparing its main report for the Security Council, Dutch officials were continuously assessing the consuls, as if attempting to divine what they would deliver in their final report. The recurring themes were that Foote and Vanderstichelen were completely “on side” and working in the

Dutch interest;³⁵ Lambert supported the Republican viewpoint, but should have known better, as he had spent time in the Indies before the war;³⁶ Raux was “an ardent, albeit confused pro-Republican”;³⁷ Shepherd had at first appeared reasonable, but had hidden his pro-Republican sentiments behind a veil of “impartiality”;³⁸ Tsiang was “irresolute” and his position was “ambiguous”;³⁹ and Eaton was initially considered a potential source of “intrigues,”⁴⁰ was temporarily rehabilitated as “satisfactory,”⁴¹ but was ultimately dismissed by Van Mook when the final report was finished as a weak figure who “obscures his judgement... through a great use of alcohol.”⁴² The basis, if any, for the last statement is unknown, and within his family, at least, Eaton was noted for his moderate drinking habits.⁴³ It is noteworthy, however, that in the same document in which Van Mook condemns Eaton for arriving at wrong conclusions because of alcohol abuse, he makes the same complaint about unidentified foreign military observers (presumably not Americans, Belgians or French, who Van Mook and other Dutch officials believed were working in the Netherlands interests. He also levels similar accusations at the French consul, Raux. It is as if Van Mook could not accept that any sober or sane individual could possibly arrive at a different conclusion about the state of affairs in the Indies other than the one that he and his Dutch colleagues had endorsed.

When one reads Dutch reports about “the Indonesian question” from this period, the resentment felt against Australia and the UK is unmistakable. The Netherlands was upset with the Australian trade union ban on shipping to Indonesia, but Australia’s raising of the Indonesian conflict in the Security Council was of a different order altogether. Australia’s representative in The Hague reported the Dutch reaction as “tough self-righteous indignation.”⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the US ambassador to the Netherlands was told by a senior Dutch official that Australia’s actions in the UN could “only be considered as unfriendly.”⁴⁵ The criticisms the Dutch in the Indies levelled at the UK, however, seem less justified, as an assessment of the debates and votes in the Security Council concerning Indonesia show that

the UK appears to have made a conscious effort to deal with the Dutch leniently. Shepherd and Lambert may have expressed their views more assertively on the ground in the Indies, but there is little evidence of this to be found in the Commission reports, despite the assertions of various Dutch officials and the US consul, Foote (noted below). Eaton did state on a number of occasions that he considered the British to be Australia's allies in the Commission, but this could be read to simply mean that Shepherd and Lambert were not so transparently anti-Republican and pro-Dutch as Foote and Vanderstichelen were. The latter two are noted by both Eaton and various Dutch officials for the efforts they made to ensure the Commission's final report was as favourable to the Dutch as possible. If Eaton had undertaken any of his investigative tours with either the American or the Belgian consuls, it is unlikely that he could have persuaded them to prepare a pro-Republican report, regardless of Hudson's assertions.

Foote was a man of extreme views. In an interview with a senior Dutch official on 12 September 1947, he declared that the military observers would only need to report on cases where Republican forces had infiltrated the Dutch side. He did not regard Dutch "mopping up" operations of Republican forces to be a violation of the cease-fire order. This was the Dutch view also, but not one accepted by most of the other parties involved. Foote even declared that he could write the report for the Security Council without any further information, as his opinion was already established.⁴⁶ Foote, in fact, made a meagre contribution to the Commission's investigative work. Apart from joining the other consuls for the group interview with Dutch officials in Jakarta, he made a one-day tour to Dutch-occupied Bandung. He reported that all was peaceful, but made no real statements concerning the cease-fire apart from implying that the maintenance of Dutch control would be advantageous.⁴⁷

Foote claimed to find Australia's attitude to the Dutch and the Republic "difficult to understand" and opined that most pro-Republican policies were "based entirely on false foundations." It was Foote's belief that "95% of Indonesians" were actually "sick of [the] republic."⁴⁸ His superiors in Washington apparently had no problem with his reporting at the time and do not seem to have held Australia's opinion on the issue in high regard. On 5 August 1947, Australia's ambassador to the US, Norman Makin, visited under-secretary of state Robert Lovett to propose joint Australian-US mediation of the Indonesian conflict. Lovett offered merely to "study" the Australian suggestions and nothing came of the approach, but the general tone of Lovett's subsequent report of the meeting was that the Australians were naive and had an exaggerated sense of their own importance.⁴⁹ The Americans' actions in the Security Council and elsewhere show that that they tried to be easy on the Dutch, but international opinion progressively grew to favour the Republic and US policy moved in line. A study of the actions of the US representatives on the Committee of Good Offices could be used to support this argument, with the US growing slowly more critical of the Dutch stance.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, Foote's colleague Livengood receives scant mention in the sources (perhaps because of Foote's more forceful personality) and little is currently known of his character. However, the one investigative tour Livengood made for the Commission was to Yogyakarta with UK consul Shepherd and (if we accept the argument put forward by Hudson) their subsequent report could be considered to be pro-Republican, as it basically confirmed the observations made earlier by Eaton and Raux.⁵¹ In this sense, Livengood's contribution could be seen as a pointer to the future of US policy in Indonesia moving away from the uncritical pro-Dutch approach typified by Foote.

Vanderstichelen and Tsiang also made only one tour, visiting two Dutch-controlled districts in West Java. The resulting report suggests little activity on behalf of Vanderstichelen, while Tsiang mainly confined himself to checking on the welfare of the

local Chinese.⁵² As Yong stated, the Chinese were in a difficult situation, as so many of their people lived in Republican-held districts and could have been endangered if China had taken a pro-Dutch stance. The Chinese military observers made efforts to ingratiate themselves to the Indonesians, but the real position of the Chinese government on “the Indonesian question” remained ambiguous. The Belgian stance seems much clearer, as Vanderstichelen appears to have lost no opportunity to support the Dutch position throughout the time the Commission was in operation. The Belgian representatives in the Security Council acted in a similar fashion and it can only be assumed that the Dutch chose Belgium to be a member of the Committee of Good Offices because they believed it would act in their interests.

French consul-general Raux, meanwhile, was originally considered by Eaton to be an ally in the Commission, but by the time the final report was being prepared Raux had lost the confidence of all parties. His pro-Republican views seem to have been common knowledge with the Dutch. On 22 September, a senior Dutch official in Jakarta wrote to The Hague portraying Raux as “a determined pro-Republican” and suggesting that his government be asked to temper his views.⁵³ The Netherlands representative in Paris took up this task and later reported that the French military observers sent to work with the Commission were given precise orders to keep Raux “on the right track,” and that he had been issued unequivocal instructions to bring his comments into line with the policies the French government followed in the Security Council.⁵⁴ Raux did take heed of his new instructions, but it was not until the main report was being finalised that his fellow consuls knew of the matter. Both Eaton and Shepherd informed their governments of ~~surprise~~ [this is fine to remove] changes demanded by Raux at the last minute. According to Shepherd, Raux “nearly wrecked” the report with his introduction of a “series of preposterous amendments,” most of which were rejected.⁵⁵ When the Dutch saw the 11 October summary, and then the final report, they knew that Raux’s “volte-face had come too late to change the report in [the

Netherlands] favour,” as both documents clearly bore “the stamp of his first pro-Republican period.”⁵⁶ Van Mook suggested more than once that Raux’s “eccentric” behaviour was beyond his control, being due to his “excesses in a particular area.”⁵⁷ As noted, Van Mook credited alcohol with clouding the judgement of Eaton and of certain foreign military observers, but it is not clear in Raux’s case whether it was alcohol or something else that was blamed.

Military Observers

The decision to ask the governments of the Commission members to send twenty-four military officers “for observance of [the] ‘cease fire’ order and to obtain any other relevant information” was made at the Commission’s first meeting in Jakarta on 1 September 1947.⁵⁸ The four Australian observers arrived in Jakarta on 13 September and were the first in the field. Two were based in Yogyakarta to observe activities in Republican-held areas, and two were based in Surabaya to observe Dutch-controlled territory. They spent most of their time travelling and interviewing a range of officials and collected a large number of documents and maps. They felt they were as well informed as possible in the time available and wrote a comprehensive report of their findings. The Australian observers confirmed a number of points made in the consuls’ tour reports, such as concluding that the different interpretations of the two sides of the meaning of the cease-fire order was “the major factor contributing to the continuance of hostilities.” In light of the oft-made criticism that the Australians were anti-Dutch, it is interesting to note that the observers reported conditions in Dutch-controlled areas to be “reasonably stable,” and that the Dutch military treated the Indonesian population “with understanding, justice and tolerance.”⁵⁹

The UK also sent four observers. They arrived shortly after the Australians and two of them accompanied Eaton, Lambert, and Raux on their tour of Sumatra. A short report by

those observers was included as an annex to the consuls' tour report and was the only acknowledged contribution by any of the observers to make it into the Commission's final report. The attention the observers paid to damage inflicted on British property in the areas visited is interesting.⁶⁰ This was not what the Commission had requested them to do, but one imagines they had received instructions from their government to take note of such matters. The next observers to arrive were two Belgians and two Frenchmen, who travelled from the Netherlands aboard the same aircraft, landing in Jakarta on 19 September. It was announced on their arrival that the Belgians would later be working with their countryman on the Committee of Good Offices.⁶¹ Otherwise, it seems the Belgians and the French decided to work together, travelling in pairs to different locations.⁶² As noted earlier, the French observers also had a brief to maintain a watch on the behaviour of consul-general Raux, but they were later joined by a third observer, an expert on Japanese matters, whose task was to discover if the Japanese had established an organisation to keep Japanese influence in the Indies after the war. Such intelligence was important to the French because it was also a matter of concern in their colonies in Indochina.⁶³ It was, however, totally unrelated to the work the observers were supposed to be doing.

The four Chinese observers who arrived in Jakarta on 26 September were also not solely concerned with the observation of the cease-fire order, but had come as well to observe the conditions affecting the Chinese population and to bring some comfort and consolation to those who had been dislocated and lost property, family or friends.⁶⁴ The Chinese observers undertook investigative tours in various Dutch- and Republican-held parts of Java and Sumatra. While much of their work sounds as if it was of the type that they were requested to perform by the Commission, it is clear that they concentrated on areas with large Chinese populations. In so doing they uncovered stories of forced evacuations, destruction of property and many killings. It was clearly their purpose to prevent a repetition of such actions if

possible. All of them talked with Republican officials about these matters, but one of them had been specially selected for the mission. Captain Pao of the Chinese Muslim Youth Association met with leaders of various Islamic groups to inform them that the 50 million Muslims in China had great sympathy with the Republic's aims, but that the destruction and theft of Chinese property, and the killing of Chinese people, made it difficult for Chinese Muslims to argue in favour of the Republic. Pao therefore asked for their help to prevent a recurrence of such violence.⁶⁵ It is not clear if his attempt to arouse sympathy for the Chinese had any effect, but it is clear that such action was completely outside the ambit given by the Commission.

The eight American observers (by far the largest number) only arrived in Jakarta on 30 September. By that time, the Commission's final report was essentially complete, but Foote refused to sign it until he received reports from his observers. Australian officials considered the Americans' late arrival and Foote's stance on finalising the report to be a delaying tactic meant to allow the Dutch "to determine the final outcome" by continuing with their "mopping up" operations without comment from the Security Council.⁶⁶ Foote later announced that the US military observers' reports would not be shared with the other members of the Commission, which resulted in the abandonment of the joint military report that it had always been envisaged would be part of the final report.⁶⁷ By refusing to allow its observers to cooperate with the other observers, or to share the information they obtained, the US effectively prevented them from making any contribution to the Commission's work, which was the only reason they were supposed to be in Indonesia in the first place. So what were they doing instead? American records show the US observers did investigate the reasons for the failure of the cease-fire order and their conclusions were not so dissimilar to those included in the consuls' final report.⁶⁸ But Dutch records show this was not all they did. The leader of the American observers was a military intelligence officer, Colonel Myers. A

Dutch report from the time he and seven other officers were based in East Java reveals that they asked many questions unrelated to the present conflict. The purpose of these questions seemed to be to ascertain the value of the Dutch troops, their proficiency, and discipline, as well as the productive capacity of the territory they occupied and their ability to prevent sabotage.⁶⁹ A senior Dutch official surmised that “[t]he eventuality that the American government must have its eyes on is obviously a new world conflict in which the Pacific would be involved and in which presumably the Ned. Indies would this time be an important strategic base from the beginning.” He noted that the Americans claimed their delayed arrival in Jakarta was caused by an involuntary stay in Saigon due to bad weather and trouble with their aircraft, but whatever the reason for the delay, one could assume “the American officers have (unobtrusively) cast their eyes over the situation there too.”⁷⁰ The information gathered was potentially useful to US policymakers, but as the US military observers shared no information with the consuls, their contribution to the Commission was negligible.

Despite the military observers being used by governments for their own purposes, the Commission’s decision to appoint observers did create an important precedent. Most of the observers left Indonesia around the time the Commission’s final report was completed, but the Security Council later asked all members of the Commission to supply military observers to assist the Committee of Good Offices and it remained their responsibility up to the transfer of sovereignty and beyond.⁷¹ The consuls’ close liaison with the observers meant they came to know intimately all the small details required for the smooth operation of such a venture. The consuls passed on suggestions to their governments and directly to the UN on matters as diverse as levels of recompense for the observers, standards of accommodation and recommendations that the observers be paid directly by the UN. One of the main lessons that must have been learnt by the UN from the Commission’s experience with the observers was the inadvisability of leaving such personnel under the direction of individual governments. In

several cases the military observers sent to assist the Commission were involved in activities unrelated to the tasks they had initially been asked to perform. A lack of overall command meant that individual governments could order their observers to do whatever they wanted them to do. In Indonesia in 1947, the consuls and the military observers were operating in wholly novel circumstances, as they were tasked with reporting on the very first cease fire ordered by the Security Council. In future operations the UN was able to benefit from this experience and could avoid making many of the same mistakes. The UN has since run scores of peacekeeping operations, but all could be said to be the successors of the military observers first requested by the Commission in Jakarta on 1 September 1947.

The Commission's Final Report

Many of the conclusions made by Eaton and Raux after the first Commission investigative tour were reproduced in the final report. Yet there were also new elements that caused some controversy when the report came to be debated in the Security Council.

The consuls summarised their findings in the final report as follows:

- I. Cease Fire Orders were duly given but there was no confidence by Dutch or Indonesians that the other side would carry them out, and no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about means of giving effect to the order.
- II. While the Republican Government ordered their troops to remain in their positions and to cease hostilities the N.E.I. Government considered it incumbent on them to proceed with the restoration of law and order within the limits laid down by them.

- III. The rapid Dutch advance by-passed considerable Republican forces, which remained in their positions in accordance with the Republican Cease Fire Order, while they were subject to mopping up operations by troops under Dutch command in accordance with the Dutch interpretation of the order. The Republican Government directed their forces to oppose movements within Dutch held territory. The different interpretations of the Cease Fire Order by each side thus made it impossible for the order to be observed.
- IV. Apart from actions involving regular forces, a considerable amount of banditry, including murder, arson and looting, is still being carried on by irregular bands.
- V. The population suffered considerably even before the police action from banditry and the scorched earth policy. This was intensified during and after the police action. The Chinese were a special target.
- VI. Administration and cultivation are proceeding under emergency conditions in both Dutch and Republican held territory. In the former there is considerable fear of banditry in the meantime and Republican reprisals in the future. In the latter there are widespread shortages owing to the cessation of normal import and export trade. In Republican areas the food situation in most districts is good at present but may deteriorate in a few months' time.
- VII. The influential class of Indonesians who number not more than five per cent of the population are practically all nationalists and seek some form of independence although not necessarily supporting the present Republic. There is little hatred of the Dutch as individuals, and their assistance in running the country is recognised as essential.⁷²

Reactions to the Commission's Report

In a discussion with a senior Dutch official about the forthcoming final report, Foote declared that “[t]he Australians and the British crucified you,” so it is unsurprising that the Dutch were apprehensive while waiting for that report.⁷³ When it arrived, lieutenant governor-general Van Mook declared it was “not easy reading” for the Dutch. According to him, the consuls gained a completely false impression of the Republic, as they had only been allowed to visit show-places and had not seen through the facade. Nevertheless, Van Mook considered the final report to have been “a compromise”; his understanding was that the report was drafted by Eaton and Tsiang, but subsequently revised by Foote and Vanderstichelen.⁷⁴ The Dutch appear to have been ultra-sensitive to any perceived criticism or denial of their assessment of the Republic, or the situation in Indonesia in general. But while Van Mook and his colleagues were not pleased with the consuls’ report, more recent scholarship has characterised the final report as “manifestly pro-Netherlands.” The main concern was the claim that the elite class of Indonesians who supported independence constituted only five percent of the population, and the further claims that there was little hatred of the Dutch and their assistance in running the country was recognised as indispensable.⁷⁵ While debating the matter in the Security Council, the Philippines, Polish, and Russian representatives all condemned the report on the basis of the inclusion of such “political evaluations.” They were joined in their criticism by the Indian representative, attending as a non-member, who declared that parts of the report were “akin to propaganda.”⁷⁶

On what evidence the consuls concluded that only five percent of Indonesians supported independence is unknown and the statement seems to have been criticised justly. However, the consuls’ claims that “[t]here [was] little hatred of the Dutch as individuals, and their assistance in running the country [was] recognised as essential” were supported by Indonesian statements, including comments made by prime minister Amir during interviews

with the consuls in Yogyakarta.⁷⁷ Despite substantial evidence to the contrary, the Dutch perceived the consuls' report as "pro-Republican" and looked askance at any individuals or governments who queried their rights in Indonesia in any way. There seems to have been a general failure on the part of the Dutch, both in Indonesia and in the Netherlands, to acknowledge the changed political realities of the postwar period. They attempted to ignore the growing anticolonial sentiment in the international community and took increasingly belligerent action in their attempt to force their will on the Indonesians.⁷⁸ It was a policy doomed to fail and within a period of only a little over two years after the Commission submitted its report to the Security Council, the Netherlands finally transferred sovereignty to an independent Indonesia in late 1949.

The Commission's Achievements and Legacy for Australian-Indonesian Relations

The transfer of sovereignty was the result of much work by the Committee of Good Offices and extensive lobbying and negotiation in the UN and other forums. The Committee of Good Offices had access to all the reports created by the Commission to assist it in its work. Those reports were also of great importance during debates in the Security Council and elsewhere. The Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices were created on the same day, but it took over two months for the latter to begin its operations in Indonesia. The Commission, on the other hand, was in action within one week and there seems little doubt that its sudden appearance in the midst of the Dutch-Indonesian conflict played an important role in inhibiting the Dutch, who may otherwise have destroyed the Republic before the Committee of Good Offices even arrived. The presence of the Commission's military observers was of consequence in this regard. Although the observers were put to uses other than those for which they were required by the Commission, they played a ground-breaking role and provided many important lessons for later UN missions.

Australia's action in raising "the Indonesian question" in the Security Council and its subsequent participation in the Consular Commission and the Committee of Good Offices were important milestones in Australian diplomacy in its region. It had wanted to establish an ongoing fruitful relationship with Indonesia, and these matters were all seen as contributing to that goal. However, Eaton warned after his very first tour into Republican territory that Indonesian expectations would make things difficult for Australia.⁷⁹ Eaton did not elaborate, but one can speculate that he meant a number of things, such as that Australia may have difficulty in meeting Indonesia's requests for goods and services, or that a change in the Australian government could lead to a weakening of its current pro-Republican policy, as the opposition was known to disagree with much of the government's agenda. Another factor was Australia's racist immigration policy (supported by both the government and the opposition) that would have disallowed almost all Indonesians from settling in Australia simply because they were Asians. The existence of such a policy did not augur well for friendship between the two countries. Most likely, however, Eaton was hinting at the reality that while Australia supported Indonesia's independence goals, it had taken action on "the Indonesian question" mainly out of self-interest, that is, as part of an effort to promote and protect trade and stability in the region. If Indonesia was later to prove a liability to those goals, it could not expect continued Australian support. This in fact happened almost immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, as Australia swung its support behind the Netherlands' retention of West New Guinea, which it had refused to hand over to Indonesia. That dispute dragged on until 1962. In 1963, Australia found itself in opposition to Indonesia once again when Sukarno declared his policy of "confrontation" with Malaysia. The relationship between the two countries has had many ups and downs in the years since then, but the close friendship that seems to have existed in the second half of the 1940s has never been replicated. However, if Australia had not taken "the Indonesian question" to the

Security Council in 1947, and had not taken part in the resulting Commission and the Committee of Good Offices, there may have been little basis for friendship at all. This is a matter well understood by both countries, and the spirit of 1947 is sure to be invoked whenever Indonesia and Australia wish to declare their shared interests and friendship. When looked at this way, it is clear that Australia's involvement in the 1947 Consular Commission has been of enduring value for the Australian-Indonesian relationship.

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Notes

¹ Moore, “Dutch Decolonization,” 223.

² For example, Adil, *Australia’s Relations with Indonesia*; George, *Australia and the Indonesian Revolution*; Hudson, “Australia and Indonesian Independence.”

³ George, *Australia and the Indonesian Revolution*, 20.

⁴ Bolton, “Evatt, Herbert Vere”; Adil, *Australia’s Relations with Indonesia*, 18.

⁵ O’Hare and Reid, *Australia dan Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Indonesia – Australia and Indonesia’s Struggle for Independence*, 14–20. For more on the shipping ban, see Lockwood, *Black Armada*.

⁶ See the Linggajati Agreement in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 507–9.

⁷ Document 133, “Bondan to Chifley. Letter. Brisbane, 21 July 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 134–36.

⁸ Document 138, “Burton to Evatt. Cablegram 31. Canberra, 23 July 1947,” in *ibid.*, 139–40.

⁹ Document 144, “Usman to Chifley. Telegram. Melbourne, 23 July 1947,” in *ibid.*, 146.

¹⁰ Document 150, “Addison to Australian Government. Cablegram D642. London, 24 July 1947,” in *ibid.*, 150.

¹¹ “Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Villard) to the Counselor (Bohlen), Washington, July 29, 1947,” in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 994–96.

¹² UN, “27 (1947) Resolution of 1 August 1947” [S/459].

¹³ George, *Australia and the Indonesian Revolution*, 84–85; Taylor, *Indonesian Independence and the United Nations*, 50–51.

¹⁴ UN, “Cablegram from the Vice-Premier of the Republic of Indonesia addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 5 August 1947,” issued on 6 August 1947 as UN Security Council S/469; UN, “Telegram from the Vice-Premier of the Republic of Indonesia

to the President of the Security Council dated 6 August 1947,” issued on 7 August 1947 as UN Security Council S/475.

¹⁵ Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 212–18.

¹⁶ Document 282, “Australian Delegation, United Nations, to Department of External Affairs. Cablegram UN775. New York, 13 August 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 261–62.

¹⁷ UN, “30 (1947) Resolution of 25 August 1947” [S/525, I].

¹⁸ UN, “31 (1947) Resolution of 25 August 1947” [S/525, II].

¹⁹ Document 339, “Department of External Affairs to Eaton. Cablegram 273. Canberra, 19 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 316.

²⁰ “Department of External Affairs to Australian Consul-General. Cablegram 291. 3 October 1947,” in National Archives of Australia (NAA): A1838, 377/1/2 PART 1.

²¹ Document 430, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 31 aug. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 10*, 706–7.

²² Document 306, “Eaton to Department of External Affairs. Cablegram 294. Batavia, 31 August 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 288–89.

²³ Document 309, “Eaton to Department of External Affairs. Cablegram 295. Batavia, 1 September 1947,” in *ibid.*, 290–1.

²⁴ Document 316, “Eaton to Department of External Affairs. Cablegram 299. Batavia, 7 September 1947,” in *ibid.*, 297–98. See also “Appendix I” in UN, “Report by the Consular Commission,” issued on 22 October 1947 as UN Security Council S/586.

²⁵ UN, “Interim Report from the Consular Commission at Batavia. September 22, 1947,” issued on 3 October 1947 as UN Security Council S/573; Document 372, “Eaton to Burton. Cablegram 360. Batavia, 11 October 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 352–53; and UN, “Report by the Consular Commission.”

²⁶ Document 264, “Eaton to Department of External Affairs. Cablegram 258. Batavia, 5 October 1948”; and Document 274, “Eaton to Burton. Memorandum. Batavia, 11 October 1948”; both in Dorling and Lee, *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, 313, 321; Eaton, “Journey to Jogja,” 3–6.

²⁷ “Eaton to the Department of External Affairs. Departmental Despatch 2/1949. Batavia, 19 August 1949,” in NAA: A4231, 1949/BATAVIA.

²⁸ Yong, *H.J. van Mook*, 165.

²⁹ Hudson, “Australia and Indonesian Independence,” 232–33.

³⁰ Document 324, “Eaton to Burton. Letter. Batavia, 8 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 304–5.

³¹ Farram, *Charles ‘Moth’ Eaton*; Farram, *A Short-lived Enthusiasm*.

³² “Francis M. Shepherd to R.H.S. Allen. British Consulate-General, Batavia, 12 September, 1947. 1/331/47,” in National Archives (UK), FO 810/4.

³³ “Francis M. Shepherd to R.H.S. Allen. British Consulate-General, Batavia, 16 October, 1947. 30/66/47,” in *ibid.*

³⁴ Document 324, “Eaton to Burton. Letter. Batavia, 8 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 304–5.

³⁵ Document 102, “Lt.gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen a.i. (Beel), 24 sept. 1947”; Document 160, “Lt. gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen a.i. (Beel), 11 okt. 1947”; both in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 157–58, 278–79.

³⁶ Document 110, “Van Mook (Lt.gouverneur-generaal) aan Beel (minister-president), 26 sept. 1947,” in *ibid.*, 174.

³⁷ Document 110, “Van Mook (Lt.gouverneur-generaal) aan Beel (minister-president), 26 sept. 1947,” in *ibid.*, 174.

³⁸ Document 176, “Lt.gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen a.i. (Beel), 16 okt. 1947,” in *ibid.*, 312.

³⁹ Document 93, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 22 sept. 1947”; Document 155, “Van Mook (lt. gouverneur-generaal) aan Beel (minister-president), 6/10 okt. 1947”; both in *ibid.*, 142–43, 268–72.

⁴⁰ Document 430, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 31 aug. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 10*, 706–7.

⁴¹ Document 98, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 23 sept. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 154.

⁴² Document 155, “Van Mook (lt. gouverneur-generaal) aan Beel (minister-president), 6/10 okt. 1947,” in *ibid.*, 269.

⁴³ Personal communication from Charles Stuart Eaton, 20 August 2014.

⁴⁴ Document 310, “Officer to Burton. Cablegram Hague 152. The Hague, 2 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 291–92.

⁴⁵ “The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State, The Hague, July 31, 1947,” in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1001.

⁴⁶ Document 52, “Verslag van een onderhoud van chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) met consul-generaal van de Verenigde Staten te Batavia (Foote), 12 sept. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 84–86.

⁴⁷ “Appendix VI” in UN, ‘Report by the Consular Commission.’”

⁴⁸ “The Consul General at Batavia (Foote) to the Secretary of State, Batavia, August 1, 1947,” in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1006.

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- ⁴⁹ “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), Washington, August 5, 1947,” in *ibid.*, 1013–5.
- ⁵⁰ Moore, “Dutch Decolonization,” 269–75.
- ⁵¹ “Appendix VI” in UN, “Report by the Consular Commission.”
- ⁵² “Appendix III” in *ibid.*
- ⁵³ Document 93, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 22 sept. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 142–53.
- ⁵⁴ Document 103, “Tijdelijk zaakgelastigde te Parijs (Star Busmann) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout) 24 sept. 1947,” in *ibid.*, 159–60.
- ⁵⁵ Document 376, “Department of External Affairs to Eaton. Cablegram 300. Canberra, 14 October,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 355–56; “Francis M. Shepherd to R.H.S. Allen. British Consulate-General, Batavia, 16 October, 1947. 30/66/47,” in National Archives (UK), FO 810/4.
- ⁵⁶ Document 160, “Lt. gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen a.i. (Beel), 11 okt. 1947”; Document 204, “Lt. gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen a.i. (Beel), 21 okt. 1947”; both in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 279, 357.
- ⁵⁷ Document 102, “Lt.gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen a.i. (Beel), 24 sept. 1947”; Document 155, “Van Mook (Lt. gouverneur-generaal) aan Beel (minister-president), 6/10 okt. 1947”; both in *ibid.*, 269.
- ⁵⁸ Document 309, “Eaton to Department of External Affairs. Cablegram 295. Batavia, 1 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 290–91.
- ⁵⁹ Document 360, “Australian Military Observing Officers to Eaton. Batavia, 1 October 1947,” in *ibid.*, 336–42.

⁶⁰ “Appendix. Tour Report of Sumatra. Summary of Military Observers Reports,” in UN, “Report by the Consular Commission.”

⁶¹ “Penindjau-penindjau Belgie dan Fransch tiba,” *Keng Po*, 20 September 1947.

⁶² “Pengawas militair Belgie dan Frans,” 1947, *Keng Po*, 24 September; “Penindjau militair ka Magelang,” 1947, *Keng Po*, 27 September; “Consulaire Commissie dan penindjau militaire soedah balik,” 1947, *Keng Po*, 27 September.

⁶³ Document 146, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 9 okt. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 257.

⁶⁴ “Dengan B-24 penasehat militair Tionghoa tiba di Djakarta. Doea kapt. pergi ke Djokja ini pagi,” *Keng Po*, 27 September 1947.

⁶⁵ “Kuo Fu Pao sebagai wakil ‘Persariketan Pemoeda Islam Tionghoa’ aken hadlirken permoesjawaratan Masjoemi, P.S.I.I. dan G.P.I.I.,” *Keng Po*, 29 September 1947; “Pai Chung Hsi beroesaha keras menjokong perdjoeangan Republik. Katerangan Kapitein Kuo Fu Pao,” *Keng Po*, 30 September 1947.

⁶⁶ Document 358, “Burton to Evatt. Cablegram E42. Canberra, 30 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 334.

⁶⁷ Document 357, “Eaton to Department of External Affairs. Cablegram 334. Batavia, 29 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 333; Document 289, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 5 nov. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 542–44.

⁶⁸ “The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State, Batavia, October 29, 1947,” in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1063–64.

⁶⁹ Document 166, “Commandant A-divisie (De Bruyne) aan legercommandant (Spor), 14 okt. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 296–300.

⁷⁰ Document 143, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 7 oktober. 1947,” in *ibid.*, 254.

⁷¹ UN, “36 (1947) Resolution of 1 November 1947” [S/597]; UN, “67 (1949) Resolution of 28 January 1949” [S/1234].

⁷² “Chapter IV” in UN, “Report by the Consular Commission.”

⁷³ Document 129, “Chef directie Verre Oosten te Batavia (Elink Schuurman) aan minister van buitenlandse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout), 2 okt. 1947,” in Drooglever and Schouten, *Officiële Bescheiden. Deel 11*, 229.

⁷⁴ Document 176, “Lt.gouverneur-generaal (Van Mook) aan minister van overzeese gebiedsdelen a.i. (Beel), 16 okt. 1947,” in *ibid.*, 312–13.

⁷⁵ Hudson, “Australia and Indonesian Independence,” 232–33.

⁷⁶ UN, *Security Council Official Records*, Second Year, No. 97, 211th meeting, 14 October 1947; UN, *Security Council Official Records*, Second Year, No. 99, 213th meeting, 22 October 1947; and UN, *Security Council Official Records*, Second Year, No. 100, 214th meeting, 27 October 1947.

⁷⁷ “Appendix VIII” in UN, “Report by the Consular Commission.”

⁷⁸ Moore, “Dutch Decolonization,” 226.

⁷⁹ Document 324, “Eaton to Burton. Letter. Batavia, 8 September 1947,” in Dorling, *Diplomasi*, 304.